Wednesday, March 19, 2014

NHS & McKinsey: Monitor & Toyota!

Dawn, anyone?

©Am Ang Zhang 2011
The new head of Monitor may indeed be too busy to note that quoting the car industry may not be the wisest thing to do.


Q125 Chair: Thank you very much for coming. I would like to open the questioning on the subject that is at the heart of a lot of the comment about the effect of the Government’s proposals on commissioning, and that is the effect of their proposals on the establishment of stable pathways of care around the system and the effect that competition-Any Willing Provider and these concepts that have been around for some years-has on the ability of a commissioner to put in place pathways of care, relationships between care providers, that provide optimum outcomes for patients as well as value for money. Can I start with that set of issues and perhaps go to Dr Bennett first?

Dr Bennett: Yes. I will start with two points. First of all, the fundamental goal of all this, of course, is about providing the best possible care for patients, and indeed specifically in Monitor’s case we will have a duty to promote and protect the interests of users of the system. In a sense, it would be a contradiction of what I think the Bill is aiming to do if we finished up with arrangements that did not enable commissioners to commission the services that were in the best interests of their patients.
More specifically, I know people are concerned that the further introduction of competition, or indeed Any Willing Provider, might make it impossible or very difficult to arrange for different providers to collaborate and provide the sort of integrated care that you are talking about. I don’t see why that should be, not least because of the starting point, but also because we see in lots of other sectors, lots of other markets where collaboration is needed in order to meet the needs of the end user or an intermediate user, that it works perfectly well.
I am very cautious about using examples from other sectors, lest I be immediately quoted as saying "Health care is just like X", which, of course, it is not. Health care is different. But one example which I was discussing with a colleague just the other day is the way the car industry works. You have very effective competition between the manufacturers of different cars but, in practice, when you are making a car you have all sorts of suppliers working together collaborating in order to produce the finished product. Indeed, you will sometimes finish up with providers who are working with more than one manufacturer. You may think it is a big step to go from there to health care but, in practice, if what you are talking about in a similar sort of way is multiple providers working together, collaborating- maybe a couple of different groups working in competition with each other but nevertheless providing the sort of integrated or long term care that is needed-then that should be entirely consistent with a degree of competition.

Toyota, one of the most successful motor car companies ran into major safety problems leading to recalls and litigations:

Toyota has, for the past few years, been expanding its business rapidly. Quite frankly, I fear the pace at which we have grown may have been too quick. I would like to point out here that Toyota's priority has traditionally been the following: First; Safety, Second; Quality, and Third; Volume. These priorities became confused, and we were not able to stop, think, and make improvements as much as we were able to before, and our basic stance to listen to customers' voices to make better products has weakened somewhat. We pursued growth over the speed at which we were able to develop our people and our organization, and we should sincerely be mindful of that. I regret that this has resulted in the safety issues described in the recalls we face today, and I am deeply sorry for any accidents that Toyota drivers have experienced. Especially, I would like to extend my condolences to the members of the Saylor family, for the accident in San Diego. I would like to send my prayers again, and I will do everything in my power to ensure that such a tragedy never happens again.
                                 Akio Toyoda, the president and CEO of Toyota



Toyota eventually recalled millions of vehicles — one of the largest consumer recalls in the history of the automotive industry. But the Justice Department found that the company did not come clean soon enough.

“Today, we can say for certain that Toyota intentionally concealed information and misled the public about the safety issues behind these recalls,” Attorney General Eric Holder said in a statement. “Rather than promptly disclosing and correcting safety issues about which they were aware, Toyota made misleading public statements to consumers and gave inaccurate facts to Members of Congress.”

As part of the deal, Toyota admitted wrongdoing and will pay a $1.2 billion fine. The financial penalty is the largest ever imposed on a car company, according to the Justice Department.


But the whole thing may indeed be academic: see the following exchanges earlier in the same sitting:

End of a state provided National Health Service?

Q114 Chair: To the Commissioning Board and then there is the question of the-
Professor Corrigan: That is what I am unclear about in the Board. The Secretary of State talks about a mandate to the Commissioning Board. Whether that mandate means I then will answer a question about a particular locality within the year, again, force majeure, I don’t think he will have a choice. But that may not be the powers the Bill gives.
Nigel Edwards: He has no powers to intervene in individual consortium areas.
Chair: Are there any other issues here?

Q115 Rosie Cooper: Yes, if I may. Under the Bill, the Secretary of State will no longer have a statutory duty to provide health services and will only have to act with a view to securing the provision of health services in relation to the Board. How accurate is it to see this as spelling the end of a state provided National Health Service?

Nigel EdwardsThat is precisely what it is, is it not? That is what it says. It is there in black and white. That is my reading of it as well. In fact, when every NHS hospital is a foundation trust, apart from the fact that the state would be a residual owner of roughly £36 billion of assets which belong to the taxpayer, there is no direct state control over the provision of health care except indirectly through the commissioning process. That is my reading of it.

Q116 Chair: Can I push on that because Rosie’s question was: "Is this the end of state provided health care?" The trusts are still owned by the state and they are delivering care in response to a tax funded budget that is accountable, through the process we have been discussing, to the commissioning boards.
Nigel Edwards: I was taking a narrower view of the definition. But you are absolutely right, yes.
Professor Paton: I am not trying to be smart but that expresses part of the theology of the purchaser-provider split, expressed in 1989 to 1991, which was suspended in culture but not in structure between 1997 and 2001 and then was gradually rolled out again in a new and indeed more radical form. It is just putting the top hat on that. That is what it is saying, but the practical reality will be exactly as the Chairman says. In other words, the reality is that public money is in the providers by one way or another and the theology may not be worth more than that proverbial bucket of spit when it comes to the-

McKinsey:

Tony Blair must indeed be very proud; his people are now on both sides, private health provider side and health regulator side of a Conservative government.


Ex-Blair: Patricia Hewitt: now with Cinven (Bupa Hospitals)

Simon Stevens: was with UnitedHealth  Now back!


Stevens knows he has taken on a non-job.  The boss of the Carbuncle is just one part of a deathly trinity; Flat-Earthers, Off-Sick and the Carbuncle.  A deliberate attempt to distribute leadership and power across one of the world's largest remaining nationalised industries.  The rearrangement cost a fortune and doesn't work; we all know that.

I doubt Stevens, a man with a cultivated, international management background, will have much truck with Flat-Earth inspection and will regard Off-Sick as an ornament. He is a Balliol scholar and former Labour Councillor and was plucked from obscurity by old-Labour's Frank Dobson but it was with Alan Milburn that he flourished.  He wrote The NHS Plan, introducing PCGs and later PCTs, then moved to become Tony Blair's Health-SpAd.


Later he ran a chunk of US healthcare giant United Health, travelling the world, accumulating enough Air-Miles for a trip to Jupiter and enough knowledge to know markets in healthcare don't work.

Dr David Bennett is the current head of Monitor. He is NOT a medical doctor.

But I do not want to give credit to Blair. According to The Independent it is McKinsey: The Jesuits of Capitalism.

“They are the modern buccaneers of the business world. They jet between cities, rack up huge expenses, and charge up to £6,000 a day to think the unthinkable for clients including big corporations and governments.

They are the star consultants of McKinsey, the élite global management consultancy. Their backgrounds are diverse - former SAS commandos, business people, aid workers - but they are drawn together by the distinct McKinsey culture. Known as "the Firm" or the "McKinsey Mafia", they are radical, zealous - and above all secretive.

But now, it seems, McKinsey is becoming the problem rather than the solution. After almost 80 years as the most prestigious name in the management consultancy world, these "Jesuits of capitalism"are under attack.

McKinsey stands accused of cronyism, greed and arrogance, as a result of associated scandals that stretch from the offices of Enron in Houston, Texas, to the corridors of 10 Downing Street.”



“You can’t get fired for hiring McKinsey & Company.”


It often goes unmentioned, but McKinsey has indeed offered some of the worst advice in the annals of business. Enron? Check. Time Warner’s merger with AOL? Check. General Motors’s poor strategy against the Japanese automakers? Check. It told AT&T in 1980 that it expected the market for cellphones in the United States in 2000 would amount to only 900,000 subscribers. It turned out to be 109 million. The list goes on.

A thought-provoking new book called “The Firm: The Story of McKinsey and Its Secret Influence on American Business,” which comes out next Tuesday, offers a fascinating look behind the company’s success.

The book, by Duff McDonald, chronicles McKinsey’s rise but also raises an important question about it that is applicable to the entire netherworld of consultants, advisers and other corporate hangers-on: “Are they worth it or not?”

The answer amounts to hundreds of billions of dollars annually. Indeed, the army of advisers whispering into the ear of Verizon and Vodafone (its C.E.O. is a former McKinsey partner) over the weekend for their work on the $130 billion deal stand to make over $200 million alone. And, perhaps most important, they don’t have to give the money back if the deal turns sour.


Mr. McDonald’s book explores the remarkable and intriguing disconnect between the advice McKinsey offers and the ultimate results.

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